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This paper theoretically formulated and empirically explored the relationship 
between exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) for (average) market price and an individual 
country's price, using steel products data in the US market, with special reference to two 
major steel exporting countries, Korea and Japan. It was found that the direction of 
market ERPT can be different from that of individual ERPT that each exporter 
experiences, due to strategic interactions among producers and different parameters. 
Vector error correction (VEC) models and impulse response analysis were used with the 
statistical inference based on the bootstrap-after- bootstrap of Kilian (1998) for short-run, 
and the fully modified estimation of Phillips and Hansen (1990) was used for long-run. 
Empirical results indicate that market ERPT in the US market due to changes in 
Korea-US exchange rates is different from those due to changes in Japan-US exchange 
rates. The framework developed in this study indicates that this phenomenon is attributed 
to either (i) the two countries have individual ERPTs of different magnitudes and 
directions for the products in the US market, or (ii) the pricing strategies of the other 
exporters' (to the US steel market) respond differently depending on whether the price of 
the product from Korea changes or that from Japan does. As each exporter's ERPT can be 
significantly different, and market response to each country's ERPT can be also different, 
this study concludes that it is crucial for an exporter to understand how competitors in the 
market respond to changes in its price, as well as to understand how its price changes 
when the relevant exchange rate fluctuates.
.............................................................................................................................................
환율의 변화에 따른 개별 교역재 가격의 변화는 ‘환율전이효과(Exchange rate 
pass-through)’로 불리며, 국제경제학의 가장 중요한 연구분야 중의 하나로 인식되
고 있다. 또한 환율변화 당사국의 교역재 가격변화에 따라 시장전체에서 일어나는 
환율의 전이현상은, 수출시장과 특정수출국의 환율이 변화할 때 수출국의 가격책
정전략과 시장전체의 반응에 대한 정보를 제공해줄 수 있다는 점에서 깊은 연구가 
필요하다. 그러나 대부분의 연구는 환율변화에 따른 특정 국가의 수출재 가격변화
만을 고려할 뿐, 경쟁국 재화가격의 변화나, 이에 따른 수출대상국의 재화시장이 
전체적으로 받는 충격에 대한 연구는 거의 이루어지지 않고 있다. 본 논문은, 한
국과 일본의 대미 달러 환율변화에 따른 철강재의 가격변화를 통해 시장의 반응
을 분석한다. Bootstrap-after-bootstrap을 활용한 vector error correction 모형과 이
에 따른 충격반응함수분석, 그리고 Phillips-Hansen의 추정방법(fully modified 
estimation)을 통한 분석은 몇 가지 중요한 시사점을 제공하는데, 그중 가장 중요한 
두 가지를 요약하면 다음과 같다. 즉, (i) 한일 양국의 환율변화는 미국 철강시장에
서의 양국 수출철강가격에 대해 서로 다른 개별적 전이효과를 야기하며, (ii) 여타 
수출국의 반응도 한일 양국 중 어느 나라 제품의 가격이 변화하는가에 따라 달라
진다는 것이다. 이에 따라 같은 비율의 환율변화에 대해서도 그 당사국에 따라 시
장의 가격반응은 달라지게 됨을 알 수 있다. 
ABSTRACT
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I. Introduction 
 
 
The post-Bretton Woods era that allowed the free fluctuation of ex-
change rates provided the impetus for research on the effect of ex-
change rate shocks on commodity prices. This topic was explored 
more intensively in the 1980s as economies experienced an unprece-
dented fluctuation in real exchange rates accompanied by the appre-
ciation (until 1985), and the subsequent depreciation of the US dollar 
in the same decade. While the first few years of the 1990s have been 
characterized as a period of stability in foreign exchange markets as 
Goldberg and Knetter (1997) point out, there were still some notably 
large fluctuations in various currency values. In the 1980’s and 1990’s, 
it was frequently observed that the price of commodities in an import-
ing country did not fluctuate as expected or predicted by the tradi-
tional models such as the law of one price.  
The incomplete pass-through  (when changes in the exchange rates 
are not fully transferred to commodity prices), or perverse pass-
through (when changes in the exchange rate influence commodity 
prices in unexpected ways), observed in these periods was, in general, 
attributed by researchers to the fact that foreign producers may re-
spond to a dollar appreciation by partially decreasing their prices and 
also increasing their profit margins. On the other hand, in periods of 
dollar depreciation it was observed that they may increase their prices 
but also reduce their profit margins, in order to keep up sales and de-
fend their market share (for example, Gagnon & Knetter, 1995; Krug-
man, 1987; Tivig, 1996; Varangis & Duncan, 1993).  
Notwithstanding some unexpected outcomes such as perverse 
movement or no pass-through of commodity prices, most studies that 
utilized disaggregated data (such as 4-digit country specific industry 
data) reported the existence of pass-through. However, the extent of 
pass-through was partial and differentiated by periods and market 
structure, across regions and products (for example, Feenstra, 1989; 
Feenstra, Gagnon & Knetter, 1996; Gagnon & Knetter, 1995; Knetter, 
1989, 1995; Marston, 1990). 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between 
exchange rate pass-through (hereafter ERPT) for individual producers 
and for the market. While studies on ERPT for individual producers 
have been extensively carried out, it is surprising that the effect of 
changes in a specific exchange rate on the market price (hereafter mar-
ket exchange rate pass-through or market ERPT) has seldom been exam-
ined.1  A few exceptions include Rindler and Yandle (1972), Sjaastad 
                                                 
1 In fact, when the law of one price prevails or the market is perfectly competitive, the mar-
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(1985), Sjaastad and Scacciavilani (1996), and Tcha and Sjaastad (1998). 
While these studies explored the effect of one-period shocks on com-
modity markets in a multi-period open economy, they did not exam-
ine the mechanism of how the individual ERPT is related to the mar-
ket ERPT. In imperfectly competitive markets, all competitors’ prices 
(and therefore market shares) are closely related to one another by 
strategic interaction, hence ERPT for the whole market can be differ-
ent from that for an individual producer experiencing exchange rate 
fluctuations.   
Due to the nature of oligopoly markets or implicit cartels, it is 
sometimes difficult to find each individual producer’s real price re-
sponse to a given change in a certain exchange rate, especially where 
only the weighted average market price is announced.  Different cate-
gorization of products across countries also hinders the direct obser-
vation of individual prices. Moreover, the analysis of the response of 
the market price to exchange rate shocks will provide useful market 
information that the analysis of individual producer’s ERPT cannot 
provide.  This paper theoretically develops a model, which explains 
the relationship between the individual ERPT and the market ERPT, 
by accommodating the aforementioned problems associated with 
market prices and data deficiencies. The theoretical framework to ana-
lyze individual producers behavior is based on Froot and Klemperer 
(1989) and Tivig (1996), which were widely applied in studies on 
ERPT for individual producers, such as Gross and Schmitt (2000). This 
study goes one step further, by analyzing the market ERPT and its 
relationship with the individual ERPT. Necessary and sufficient con-
ditions to define the direction of movements of market and individual 
prices will be explored.  Further discussions on this subject will be 
introduced after ERPT for the US steel market is empirically analyzed.  
 
 
II. The Market Exchange Rate Pass-Through 
 
 
1. Market ERPT and Individual ERPT 
 
The weighted average market price of a steel product that we are  
interested in is   at time t, where ω
1
n
t it
i
P ω
=
= ∑ itP
                                                                                                        
i is country i’s mar- 
 
ket ERPT will provide the same results as the individual ERPT. However, when the market is 
imperfect, the change of average price in the market is not necessarily identical to that of the 
price of a good from the country whose exchange rate varies. 
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ket share and Pi is country i’s price in the US market, which is deter-
mined from profit maximization process of exporter i. The effect of 
changes in the exchange rate between country J and the US  (eJ) on the 
weighted average market price is, leaving out time subscript t for 
simplicity, 
 
1
n
J Ji i i
i i
J J J i J Ji
P PP PP P P
e P e P P P
ω ω
=
⎡ ⎤∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂= = +⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ Je . (1) 
 
Due to imperfect competition in the market, both Pi and ωi are af-
fected by PJ, unless each country’s market share equi-proportionally 
changes with total demand when PJ changes. Therefore, using elastic-
ities, equation (1) can be rewritten as  
 
1
n
J Ji i i i i i i i
J J i i J i J J ii
P PP P P P PP
e e P P P P P P P
ω ω
ω=
⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ = ⋅ +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠∑ J J
P ω  
1
(1 )
n
J i i
J ii iJ
J Ji
P P
e P
ωω φ σ ω=
⎛ ⎞∂ ⎜= − ⋅⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠
∑
J
⎟ , (2) 
 
where φii  is the elasticity of country i’s market share with respect 
to Pi . ., i iii
i i
Pi e
P
ωφ ω
⎛ ∂= −⎜ ∂⎝ ⎠
⎞⎟ , and iJσ  is the cross elasticity of coun-
try i’s  price Pi with respect to PJ  . ., JiiJ
J i
PPi e
P P
σ⎛ ⎞∂=⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂⎝ ⎠
.2
Separating country J’s own elasticities (φJJ and JJσ , where JJσ  = 1)  
from (2) gives 
 
1 (1 )J i iJ JJ ii iJ
J J Ji J
PP P
e e P
ωω φ φ σ ω≠ J
⎡ ⎤∂∂ ⎢ ⎥= − + −⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∑ . (3) 
 
Equations (1) and (3) show that  [∂P/ ∂PJ]  is the important chain 
connecting the market ERPT and country J’s ERPT when eJ changes.  
This term  [∂P/ ∂PJ]  is, in turn, the product of country J’s market share 
                                                 
2 We do not have any presumption about the sign of this cross elasticity. Country i may in-
creases its price when country J increases its price. Alternatively, it may be the case that country 
i decreases its price as country J increases its price. It depends on country i’s profit maximization 
behavior. 
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and the constellation of parameters and variables in the bracket as 
shown in (3). Since country J’s market share ωJ is positive, the sign of  
[∂P/∂ eJ]  in (3) is determined by the sign of the bracket on the right 
side such as 
 
J
Psign
e
⎡ ⎤∂ =⎢ ⎥∂⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
1 (1 )
1 (1 )
J i i
JJ ii iJ
J Ji J
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≠
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0
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⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤∂ ⎢ ⎥− − + −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥∂⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∑
∑
>
<
 
(4) 
 
Equation (4) indicates that the market price does not necessarily 
move in the same direction as country J’s price when the exchange 
rate between country J and the destination (eJ) changes temporarily. 
An assumption helps to explore the necessary and sufficient condi-
tions in (4) further. 
 
[Assumption 1] The total market demand for a specific steel product (M) 
i s  n o t  a f f e c t e d  b y  t h e  c h a n g e  i n  a  p r o d u c e r ’ s  p r i c e  ( i . e . ,  
J
J
J
PM
P M
µ ∂= ∂  = 0, where µ J  is the elasticity of market demand with  
respect to J’s price). 3  
 
Applying this assumption to the equation for the elasticity of the 
market share for country J, φJJ, provides  
 
( / )
( /
J J
JJ
J J
M M P
P M
φ ∂= ∂ )M  = 
J J J
J J J
M P PM
P M P M
∂ ∂−∂ ∂ = εJJ - µJ = 
εJJ ,
 
where ε JJ is the elasticity of demand for country J  . . JJi e ε⎡ =⎣
                                                 
3 While this assumption is consistent with a Cobb-Douglas function with powers as weights 
(shares) of each exporter and, in general, reasonable for the factor markets investigated in this 
paper, the total market demand for final goods would change as prices change. This assumption 
is needed for the convenience of the analysis only, and does not change the findings in this paper 
significantly. 
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J J
J J
M P
P M
⎤∂ ⎥∂ ⎥⎦
. Therefore, the term that determines the sign of [∂P/ ∂PJ] is 
from (4) converted to 
 
1 (1 ) i iJJ ii iJ
J Ji J
P
P
ωφ φ σ ω≠
− + −∑ =   
1 (1 ) i iJJ ii iJ
J Ji J
P
P
ωε ε σ ω≠
− + −∑ . (5) 
 
Assumption 1 also implies that country J’s market loss due to its 
price change is  al l  absorbed by the other countries,  i .e .  
J i
J Ji J
M M
P P≠
⎡ ⎤∂ ∂⎢ = −⎢ ∂ ∂⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∑ ⎥⎥ , hence the elasticity of demand for country J’s  
products is  
 
 
J J Ji i
JJ ii iJ
J J J Ji J i J
M P P
J
M M
P M P M M
ε ε
≠ ≠
∂ ∂= = − = −∂ ∂∑ ∑ σ . (6) 
 
 
Substituting (6) for  εJJ  in (5) gives  
 
1 (1 ) i iJJ ii iJ
J Ji J
P
P
ωε ε σ ω≠
− + −∑   =   
1 ( 1 )J i iiJ ii ii
i Ji J
P P
P P
ωσ ε ε ω≠
⎡+ − +⎢⎣ ⎦∑ J⎤⎥ ,  (5)’ 
 
which indicates that, when there are  n  countries in the market, the 
direction of the market ERPT to the change in any country’s exchange 
rate depends on the magnitude and signs of all the other countries’ 
elasticities, prices and market shares as well as country J’s ERPT.  
We will first examine an extreme and simple case where all n sup-
pliers are identical, in the sense that their elasticities, prices and mar-
ket shares are initially symmetric, and then turn to look at a general 
case, where firms are allowed to be different. It will be shown that 
while both necessary and sufficient conditions are obtained in a sym-
metric case, only sufficient conditions can be derived in a more gen-
eral case.  
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2. Market ERPT with Identical Producers 
 
When all firms are identical and share the same variables and pa-
rameters, condition (5)’ reduces to   [1 + (n - 1) σ]  and, accordingly, 
the ERPT for the market is  
 
[ ]1 ( 1)J J
J J
PP n
e e
ω σ∂∂ = + −∂ ∂ . 
 
The following proposition is presented regarding the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for the direction of the price movements. 
 
[Proposition 1] When all the producers in the market are identical,  
1
( ) ( 1n
σ > −< − )
                                                
 is the necessary and sufficient condition for country  
J’s and the market prices to move to the same (opposite) direction(s), or the 
individual and the market ERPT have the same (different) signs, when the 
exchange rate between country J and the market changes4.  
 
The implication of this condition is clear. It shows that even when 
the prices of all the other producers move in the opposite direction to 
country J′s price due to their dynamic profit maximization strategy, it 
is still possible that the direction of the market ERPT is the same as 
that of country J′s, depending on the elasticity of country i′s price with 
respect to country J′s. In the duopolist case, for example, only if elas-
ticity is greater than  -1 will the market price move in the same direc-
tion as country J′s, regardless of whether country J responds normally 
or perversely, and whether all of the other countries respond normally 
and perversely. As the number of suppliers increases, [- 1/(n – 1)] ap-
proaches zero, that implies that the two ERPTs (say, country J′s and 
the US market’s) are less likely to have the same sign unless the cross 
elasticity is positive. 
 
 
3. Market ERPT with Non-identical Producers 
 
When producers are not identical, it is not possible to derive the 
sufficient and necessary conditions for the direction of market ERPT 
and country J′s ERPT in a more succinct form. Nonetheless, (5)’ is al-
ways positive if the bracket is always bigger than zero for all  i.  As Pi , 
 
4 It is open to question whether other countries would move in a different direction from 
country J. Tivig (1996) theoretically proves that σiJ  is always positive if producers operate in the 
inelastic region, while  the sign of  σiJ   is indeterminate in the elastic region. 
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Mi , PJ and MJ  are all positive, the sufficient conditions to have  
sign
J
P
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From equation (7), the sufficient conditions, that the market price 
moves in the same (opposite) direction as country J′s price, are ad-
dressed as in the following proposition. 
 
[Proposition 2] When the exchange rate between a producer (say coun-
try J) and the destination market temporarily changes;  
(i)    the market price and country J’s price move in the same direction  
if  0
( )iJ
andσ ><
1
( )
ii
J i
ii
P Pε ε
> −
<   and; 
(ii)   the market price and country J’s price move in different directions 
if  0
( )iJ
andσ ><  
1
( )
ii
J i
ii
P Pε ε
< −
>  . 
 
This proposition indicates that even when the cross price elasticity 
is positive, if country J′s price is significantly larger than other coun-
tries’ prices initially, then it is the case that the (weighted average) 
market price actually decreases (increases) as country J′s price in-
creases (decreases). This is possible as the market share country J loses 
due to the increase in its price is so large that sufficiently large 
weights are now given to other countries that have substantially lower 
prices and take market share from country J.  
All possible combinations available from [Proposition 2] are sum-
marized in Table 1. While the threshold of  σiJ, which determines 
whether country i′s price moves in the same direction as country J′s, is 
zero, the threshold of the second condition determines whether J′s 
price is larger or smaller than the product of Pi and an inverse of the  
famous ‘price mark-up’ (
1
i i
i ii
P
MC
ε
ε=
i
− ) for an imperfectly competing  
firm i.  While we have four cases (sufficient conditions) which have 
the same or different signs for ERPT for country J and the US market,  
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<Table 1> The Direction of the Two Exchange Rate Pass-Through 
and Sufficient Conditions 
 1J ii
i ii
P
P
ε
ε
−>  1J ii
i ii
P
P
ε
ε
−<  
0iJσ ≥  (I)  Same (II)  Opposite 
0iJσ <  (III)  Opposite (IV)  Same 
 
an assumption is added, which makes our analysis simpler. 
 
[Assumption 2] Prices of products from different countries are not sig-
nificantly different. 5
 
This assumption allows us to preclude Cases II and IV in Table 1, 
and to avoid tedious repetition. Case I occurs when J′s price in the US 
decreases (increases) and the other countries respond by decreasing 
(increasing) their prices. Then, the market price will decrease, with 
Assumption 2. This is so, regardless whether country J responds nor-
mally (for example, to increase/decrease its price by apprecia-
tion/depreciation of its currency) or perversely (for example, to de-
crease/increase its price by appreciation/depreciation of its currency) 
to the fluctuation of the value of its currency. If other countries do not 
follow country J and respond by changing prices in the different direc-
tion, the market price P will move in the different direction from 
country J′s price, with Assumption 2. This can be explained as the fol-
lowing; the decrease (increase) in P due to the decrease (increase) in Pi 
(and the increase in ωi) is sufficiently large to offset the increase (de-
crease) in P by the increase (decrease) in PJ. This is summarized in  
Case III. Therefore, the inequality  1iiJ
ii
P ε ε
−> iP
                                                
  can be under-  
stood as the condition necessary to allocate a sufficiently large market 
share to the country with relatively lower prices, and, consequently, 
lead to a reduction of the weighted average market price.   
Table 1 also presents the possibility of the ‘J-curve’ for the market 
ERPT, which was theoretically suggested by Tivig (1996) for individ-
ual countries. More discussion on this issue will be done in Section III 
with empirical findings.  
 
 
5 If demand is not very elastic, [(εii – 1)/εii] is considerably smaller than one and it is unreal-
istic to have such a small PJ that  PJ  < [(εii – 1)/εii] Pi as the products are quite homogenous. In 
contrast, if demand is very elastic, which indicates that the products are highly substitutable and 
prices must be very close to each other, then [(εii – 1)/εii] will be close to one. In either case, it is 
more plausible to assume that PJ  > [(εii – 1)/εii] Pi. In addition, when producers operate in the 
inelastic region (εii < 1), Cases II and IV are not available as  [(εii– 1)/εii]  is negative.   
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III. Empirical Analysis of Exchange  
Rate Pass-Through 
 
 
1. The US Steel Market and Data 
 
We are interested in the steel market for several reasons. First of all, 
in the era of e-commerce and genomics, the importance of steel to the 
economy has never diminished. As reported by the World Steel Dy-
namics (1997, 2000), the world steel market has experienced repeated 
‘booms’ and ‘downturns’. Nevertheless, steel has continued to be re-
garded as one of the most important materials and inputs necessary 
for major economic activities.  
The high volatility of steel prices, which is not removed even when 
real values are investigated, also makes research on steel prices sig-
nificant and interesting. This volatility has increased over time, and 
even appeared to accelerate as the steel industry throughout the 
world entered an era of restructuring (World Steel Dynamics, 1997). 
While various factors have contributed to this volatility, ranging from 
technological innovations and computerized production planning and 
management, to excessive investment in the steel industry of many 
countries, the volatility of steel product prices may also, in part, be 
explained by the volatility of exchange rates (Tcha and Sjaastad, 
1998).6  
In particular, this study concentrates on five steel products, which 
are quite disaggregated and may be categorized into three groups 
based on the characteristics of the production process and the final 
use of the product. Group 1 consists of two steel products; hot-rolled 
strips and hot-rolled sheets, where hot-rolled strips are used as an in-
put to produce hot-rolled sheets. Group 2 consists of another two steel 
products; hot bars and cold bars.7 Group 3 comprises three steel 
products; hot-rolled strips, cold-rolled strips and cold-rolled sheets, 
which are related from the upstream product to the downstream 
product. Utilizing data for these six steel products is in many ways 
unique. Most of the previous empirical studies on ERPT observed oli-
gopoly markets such as automobiles, where products are fairly differ-
                                                 
6 The volatility of steel prices may be also due to protection. While we recognize the rele-
vance of this variable, it is not included in this study as accurate data for various forms of protec-
tion imposed by the US are not available, including the problem of converting quantitative re-
striction into tariff-equivalent measure of protection. Further investigation is needed to overcome 
this problem.  
7 It is technically controversial whether we can categorize specific steel products into ‘hot 
bars’ and ‘cold bars’. However, the American Metal Bulletin regularly publishes the related data, 
such as prices and market shares for these categories of products. Accordingly, we follow the 
same approach and use the data published. 
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entiated (for example, Feenstra et al., 1996; Gross and Schmitt, 2000; 
Laussel et al., 1988) or other manufacturing (Fisher, 1996; Marston, 
1990), or some commodity at the aggregated level (Varangis & Dun-
can, 1993). The steel products examined in this paper are much more 
disaggregated and almost homogenous in their quality and character-
istics, regardless of where they are exported from. These features are 
consistent with the assumptions adopted in this study. Also, we hope 
that the market ERPT by the two exchange rates (Korean won–US dol-
lar and Japanese yen–US dollar) will enable us to compare the indi-
vidual ERPT of almost homogeneous products from Korea and Japan, 
and will reveal the difference between the two countries’ pricing 
strategies, which were the focus of attention in the previous studies by 
Klitgaard (1999) and Kim (1997).  
In this study, all steel prices are obtained from The Statistical 
Guide to the Metal Industries: Metal Statistics (various years), and the 
economic variables, such as exchange rates and petroleum prices, are 
collected from International Financial Statistics (various years). All 
prices and exchange rates are converted into real terms using con-
sumer price indices. The data is quarterly from 1970:1 to 1996:4 com-
prising 108 observations. The data since 1997 was excluded form the 
analysis as a kind of structural changes in the market was expected 
due to the economic crisis and accompanied violent swing in Korea-
US exchange rates, where considering the market with structural 
break is not the major concern of this study. For simplicity, we la-
belled the price of each steel product in the following manner: P1 for 
hot-rolled strips, P2 for hot-rolled sheets, P3 for hot bars, P4 for cold 
bars, P5 for cold-rolled strips and P6 for cold-rolled sheets. 
 
 
2.  Estimation Methodology and Statistical Inference 
 
If the model discussed in the previous section is generalized over 
multi-periods, each country will maximize its present discounted 
value of profit in its own currency, in the first period, based on Tivig 
(1996), Froot and Klemperer (1989) and Gross and Schmitt (2000). 
Country  J′s optimal price at  t  is, therefore, in a general form,  
 
PJ t = F(PJ’, PO’, eJ’, eO’, MCJ), 
 
where PJ  is a vector of past prices of the steel product of country J, 
PO is a matrix of past prices of the steel product from all the other 
countries, eJ  is a vector of past and present exchange rates between 
country J′s currency and US dollar, eO is a vector of past and present 
exchange rates between each country’s currency and US dollar, and  
MCJ  is the past and present marginal cost of the product in country J. 
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Among the various resources, raw materials and labor required to 
produce steel products, our study adopts petroleum as an index that 
captures the effect on costs of price changes in raw materials, whose 
significance was confirmed by Tcha and Sjaastad (1998). We consider 
the vector autoregressive (VAR) model of the form 
 
Yt = B1Yt-1 + …. + BpYt-p + δ t + ut,  (8) 
 
where Yt is the K×1 vector of variables including relevant prices 
and exchange rates at time t, and Bi′s are the K×K matrices of coeffi-
cients. The model also contains the intercept vector and linear time 
trend terms, however, these deterministic components do not appear 
in the VAR representation for simplicity of exposition, while they are 
included in estimation. Note that ut is the K×1 vector of i.i.d. innova-
tions with E(ut) = 0 and E( uttuu Σ=′) = HH′.  
The above VAR system can be written in the vector error correc-
tion form as  
 
∆Yt = Γ1∆Yt-1 + ... + Γp-1 ∆Yt-p+1 + Π (Yt-1 + γ t) + ut,  (9) 
 
where Π = B1 + …+ Bp – IK, Γi = – (Bi+1 + …+ Bp) and δ =Πγ.  When 
Yt is cointegrated with the cointegration rank r, Rank(Π) = r < K and Π 
= ab′, where a and b are respectively K×r matrices.  
The VAR model is fitted to each group of steel prices and explana-
tory variables. In each case, the vector Yt contains eJ (say, hereafter the 
value of US dollar in terms of Japanese yen), eK (hereafter the value of 
US dollar in terms of Korean won), and the petroleum price followed 
by steel prices from upstream to downstream products in the group. 
That is, five-dimensional VAR is fitted for Groups 1 (hot-rolled strips 
– hot-rolled sheets) and 2 (hot bars – cold bars), while a six-
dimensional VAR is fitted for Group 3 (hot-rolled strips – cold-rolled 
strips – cold-rolled sheets). The ordering of the variables in Yt is based 
on the Wold causality (Lütkepohl, 1991, p.52), which is important in 
the context of the impulse response analysis based on the VAR. It in-
dicates that contemporaneous causality runs from eJ and eK to steel 
prices, and not in the opposite direction, which is consistent with our 
intuition. 
For each group, the VAR order in (8) is determined so as to ensure 
that the least-squares residuals of each equation in VAR mimic a 
white noise. We attempt to find the smallest order possible for parsi-
monious parameterization. To this end, a visual inspection of the re-
sidual autocorrelation function (ACF) is conducted, accompanied by 
the use of the Ljung-Box (1978) test. It is found that the VAR(4) is ade-
quate for Groups 1 and 3, while the VAR(3) is adequate for Group 2. 
To test for the cointegration for each model we use the method devel-
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oped by Johansen (1988). We also use the fully modified OLS estima-
tor of Phillips and Hansen (1990) to estimate the long-run relationship 
among the variables. 
Impulse response analysis is conducted to examine short-run dy-
namics among the variables. This form of analysis is also closely re-
lated to causality, as zero impulse responses between two variables 
means that no dynamic causality exists between them (Lütkepohl, 
1991).8  
 
 
3. Empirical Findings and Discussions 
 
Non-stationarity of Data and Cointegration 
The presence of non-stationarity for the time series variables sug-
gests that a spurious regression problem may exist. Table 2 reports the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test statistics for all variables. Two 
ADF statistics are reported: one (τµ) from the regression with inter-
cepts but with no trends, and the other (ττ) from the regression with 
intercepts and linear trends. The order of augmentation is determined 
using Akaike Information Criteria (AIC). For most cases, the null hy- 
 
<Table 2> Unit-Root Tests: ADF Statistics 
Variable τµ ττ
P1 -3.03 (4) -1.37 (4) 
P2 -2.52 (3) -1.29 (3) 
P3 -2.48 (0) -2.39 (0) 
P4 -2.98 (0) -1.16 (0) 
P5 -2.44 (0) -1.84 (0) 
P6 -2.53 (0) -1.28 (0) 
eJ -1.78 (2) -2.40 (2) 
eK -1.85 (2) -1.91 (2) 
PE -2.48 (0) -2.86 (0) 
Note: τµ  is the ADF statistic based on the model with intercept but no trend. ττ  is  the ADF statistic based on the model with intercept and trend. 
The numbers in brackets next to the statistics are the order of augmentation cho-
sen by the AIC. 
The 5% critical values for τµ and ττ statistics are –2.89 and –3.36. 
P1: hot-rolled strips, P2: hot-rolled sheets, P3: hot bars, P4: cold-rolled strips, P5: 
cold-rolled sheets, P6: cold bars, eJ: US-Japanese exchange rate, eK: US-Korean ex-
change rate, PE: petroleum price  
                                                 
8 More information on impulse response analysis using bootstrapping technique is discussed 
in Appendix. 
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pothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected at the 5% level of significance. 
One exception is the τµ statistic for P1, where the null hypothesis is 
accepted. However, P1 shows an upward trend, and, in this case, the 
use of the ττ statistic should be more appropriate. Note that there is no 
evidence of the second unit root for any time series. Hence, we con-
cluded that all time series are integrated of order one. Table 3 reports 
the trace and maximum eigenvalue (λmax) statistics of Johansen (1988) 
for each model. For Groups 1 and 2, the null hypothesis of no cointe-
grating vector in favor of at least one cointegrating vector is rejected, 
but the possibility of three cointegrating vectors cannot be rejected at 
the 5% level of significance. For Group 3, the λmax statistic indicates 
acceptance of two cointegrating vectors, but the statistic is fairly close 
to the 10% critical value. Hence, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
Group 3 is cointegrated with three cointegrating vectors.  
 
Vector Error Correction Models and Impulse Response 
Table 4 reports the estimated error correction models for the price 
variables. For each group, where error correction terms were obtained  
 
<Table 3> Test Statistics for Cointegration 
Group 1 
Null Trace Trace (0.95) λmax λmax(0.95) 
r = 0 129.03 87.17 61.93 37.86 
r ≤ 1 67.10 63.00 29.21* 31.79 
r ≤ 2 37.89 42.34 18.45 25.42 
r ≤ 3 19.44 25.77 14.08 19.22 
r ≤ 4 5.36 12.39 5.36 12.39 
Note: *: Significant at the 10% level of significance 
Trace ( 0.95) and λmax( 0.95) indicate 5% critical values for each statistic. 
 
Group 2 
Null Trace Trace (0.95) λmax λmax(0.95) 
r = 0 117.26 87.17 48.31 37.86 
r ≤ 1 68.95 63.00 29.15* 31.79 
r ≤ 2 39.80 42.34 18.96 25.42 
r ≤ 3 20.84 25.77 11.94 19.22 
r ≤ 4 8.90 12.39 8.90 12.39 
Note: *: Significant at the 10% level of significance 
Trace ( 0.95) and λmax ( 0.95) indicate 5% critical values for each statistic. 
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<Table 3> Continued 
Group 3 
Null Trace Trace (0.95) λmax λmax(0.95) 
r = 0 183.15 115.85 64.21 43.61 
r ≤ 1 118.94 87.17 55.88 37.86 
r ≤ 2 63.06 63.00 28.99 31.79 
r ≤ 3 34.07 42.34 20.01 25.42 
r ≤ 4 14.06 25.77 8.56 19.22 
r ≤ 5 5.50 12.39 5.50 12.39 
Note: Trace ( 0.95) and λ max( 0.95) indicate 5% critical values for each statistic. 
 
using Johansens’s (1988) just identifying restrictions, the vector error 
correction (VEC) models associated with the cointegrating regressions 
are estimated. All error correction models show a reasonably good fit 
with no sign of model mis-specification, including serial correlation in 
error terms. This is evident from visual inspection of the residual ACF 
and Ljung-Box test statistics as well as the Durbin-Watson statistics 
reported. For all models, it can be seen that the current price changes 
are to some extent affected by the short-run changes in exchange rates 
and factors affecting marginal cost such as petroleum prices (PE). As 
the results associated with these VEC models are sometimes unclear 
and hard to interpret, we next use impulse response analysis to exam-
ine the short-run dynamics of the variables involved. These results are 
summarized in Figures 1 to 3.  
Figure 1 plots impulse response functions of P1 and P2 in Group 1 
against time horizon 0 to 24 (0 to 24 quarters), when one standard de-
viation shock is given to eJ, eK, PE, P1 and P2. Bootstrap-after-bootstrap 
confidence intervals with a probability content of 90% and 95% are 
given for statistical inference. If a 95% (90%) confidence interval con-
tains zero, the null hypothesis of zero impulse response value cannot 
be rejected at the 5% (10%) level of significance. It can be seen that eJ 
shows no dynamic impact on P1 and P2, as all confidence intervals 
contain zero. This result implies on the one hand, that there is no di-
rect and clear evidence that changes in eJ  affect the dollar price of the 
Japanese steel products, such as hot-rolled strips and sheets (and 
therefore the weighted average market price does not change). Alter-
natively, with the given data described in the previous section, it 
might be concluded that while the price of Japanese steel products are 
affected by the exchange rate (i.e., [∂PJ/∂eJ] ≠ 0), the weighted average 
market price of the products are not significantly affected by the  
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<Table 4> Exchange Rate Pass-Through: Error-Correction Models 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
 ∆P1 ∆P2 ∆P3 ∆P5 ∆P1 ∆P4 ∆P6 
ecm1 0.10*** -0.01 0.26*** 0.13** -0.06** -0.07* -0.03 
ecm2 -0.05* 0.11* -0.08 0.22** -0.11*** 0.04 -0.13***
ecm3     0.07*** 0.07* -0.00 
∆P1(-1) -0.08 0.01   -0.07 -0.17 0.51**
∆P1(-2) 0.21** 0.65***   0.23* 0.08 0.38*
∆P1(-3) 0.18* 0.31   0.22** 0.17 0.20 
∆P2(-1) -0.10 -0.02      
∆P2(-2) -0.06 -0.37***      
∆P2(-3) -0.05 -0.12      
∆P3(-1)   0.01 -0.01    
∆P3(-2)   0.21* -0.06    
∆P3(-3)        
∆P4(-1)     -0.18* 0.05 -0.18 
∆P4(-2)     -0.13 -0.06 -0.13 
∆P4(-3)     -0.05 0.12 -0.12 
∆P5(-1)   0.04 0.09    
∆P5(-2)   -0.21 -0.01    
∆P5(-3)        
∆P6(-1)     0.15** -0.01 0.03 
∆P6(-2)     0.10 -0.05 -0.09 
∆P6(-3)     0.01 -0.21** -0.05 
∆eJ (-1) -0.13** -0.20 -0.33** -0.23** -0.03 -0.07 0.03 
∆eJ (-2) -0.09 0.05 0.13 0.04 -0.01 -0.04 0.09 
∆eJ (-3) -0.15** 0.20   -0.10 -0.08 0.04 
∆eK (-1) 0.37*** 0.19 -0.49** 0.22 0.27** 0.10 -0.25 
∆eK (-2) -0.57*** -0.84*** -1.03*** -0.42** -0.48*** -0.16 -0.48***
∆eK (-3) -0.18 -0.16   -0.18 -0.23 0.03 
∆PE(-1) 0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 0.04 -0.03 
∆PE(-2) 0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.08*** -0.01 -0.02 0.00 
∆PE(-3) 0.02 0.00   -0.00 0.01 -0.20 
R2 0.50 0.36 0.30 0.30 0.62 0.31 0.22 
DW 2.14 1.90 2.07 2.12 2.02 2.05 1.85 
Note: *** : Significant at the 1% level of significance 
** : Significant at the 5% level of significance 
* : Significant at the 10% level of significance 
DW : the Durbin-Watson statistic 
P1 : hot-rolled strips, P2: hot-rolled sheets, P3: hot bars, P4: cold-rolled strips, P5: 
cold-rolled sheets, P6: cold bars, eJ: Japan-US exchange rate, eK: Korea-US ex-
change rate, PE: petroleum price  
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[Figure 1] Orthogonalized Impulse Response Estimates and Confi-
dence Intervals: Group 1 
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[Figure 1] Continued 
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o : 90% Bootstrap-after-bootstrap Confidence Intervals × : Impulse-response estimates 
The X-axes of all graphs indicate time horizon from 0 to 24 
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from equation (5) is insignificantly different from zero). 
In contrast, changes in eK ‘pass through’ and change the dollar 
price of the commodities in the US market, with lags. There is some 
evidence that eK affects P1 and P2 negatively (normal market ERPT) with 
a time lag, as 95% and 90% confidence intervals do not contain zero at 
the second quarter after the exchange rate shock, respectively for P1 
and P2. The price of petroleum (PE) affects the price of hot-rolled 
strips, P1, positively for five quarters once the shock is given, but ex-
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erts no impact on the price of the commodity at the end of the produc-
tion process, hot-rolled sheets (P2). This result is plausible considering 
that the impact of the petroleum price on the final product weakens as 
changes in the petroleum prices partially affect the price of hot-rolled 
strips, where, in turn, the price of hot-rolled strips only partially ex-
plains the price of hot-rolled sheets. It is also evident that P1, the price 
of hot-rolled strips, affects P2, the price of hot-rolled sheets, for two 
quarters, but that P2 has no impact on P1. Both P1 and P2, depend on 
their own pasts for several quarters.  
Figure 2 presents the impulse responses in Group 2. A shock in eJ 
has no impact on P3, the price of hot bars, and P4, the price of cold 
bars; but a shock in eK affects P3 negatively (normal market ERPT) after 
two and three quarters. P4 is also negatively (normal market ERPT) af-
fected by the shock to the Korean-US exchange rate for four quarters 
after the shock is given, although the impact is very marginal. The 
price of petroleum shows no impact on P3. It exerts a positive impact 
on P4 from quarters 4 to 7, however, the effect is marginal. It is again 
evident that changes in P3 dynamically cause changes in P4, but there 
is no evidence of causality from P4 to P3. Both Groups 1 and 2 report 
that the impulse response of the prices of downstream products (cold-
rolled strips and cold bars) to the shock in the prices of upstream 
products (hot-rolled strips and hot bars) is significant; but the reverse 
is not the case. 
Figure 3 presents Group 3, and looks at the production stages of 
hot-rolled strips, cold-rolled strips, and cold-rolled sheets. Again, a 
shock in eJ shows no impact on P1 and P6. There is some evidence that 
eJ affects P5 negatively; however, this has little practical implication as 
it happens after 12 quarters and the level of significance is very mar-
ginal. In contrast, eK affects steel prices negatively (normal market 
ERPT) in the relatively short-term, with a lag of two or three quarters. 
The price of petroleum (PE) shows a positive impact on P1 for four 
quarters. Some evidence indicates that it affects P5 positively in the 
short-run, although less severely than it affects P1, but not P6. Among 
prices, causality runs from P1 to P5 and then to P6; however, little evi-
dence of causality in the opposite direction was found.  
From the evidence related to the short-run dynamics adopting 
bootstrap-after-bootstrap methods for confidence intervals, the       
following general features emerge. First, a shock in the Japanese-US 
exchange rate in general shows no impact on steel prices in the US 
market (except in the case of P5 in Group 3, where the response to  
impulse is found after three years), while a shock in the Korean-US 
exchange rate affects them negatively (normal market PT) with a lag 
of two or three quarters. However, these results do not directly      
support Klitgaard (1999) and Kim’s (1997) assertion that Japanese 
firms actively absorbed the change in exchange rates by modifying  
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[Figure 2] Orthogonalized Impulse Response Estimates and Confi-
dence Intervals: Group 2 
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[Figure 2] Continued 
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[Figure 3] Orthogonalized Impulse Response Estimates and Confi-
dence Intervals: Group 3 
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[Figure 3] Continued 
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[Figure 3] Continued 
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The X-axes of all graphs indicate time horizon from 0 to 24 
 
their profit margins or mark-ups while Korean firms did not. It is still 
possible to interpret our results that while the individual ERPT hap-
pens to Japanese producers, there is no market ERPT. 9
In contrast to the Japanese case, Korean steel producers let the 
pass-through happen, at least partially.  Any change in petroleum 
price, which represents marginal cost conditions, affects steel prices 
positively in the short-run, but there is a strong tendency that it is 
more likely to affect those products, which are in the upstream stages 
of production. The more processed the product is, the less affected it is 
by the price of petroleum. There is little evidence that the petroleum 
price affects the prices of the final products. Utilizing commodities in 
the same production stream, the findings of this study break new 
ground and go further than previous studies, which concentrated on 
the final goods in different or differentiated categories (for example, 
Feenstra et al., 1996; Fisher, 1996; Gagnon & Knetter, 1995; Laussel et 
al., 1988). For the prices of the steel products in the same production 
stream, causality runs from the prices of upstream products to the 
prices of downstream or final products, but not in the opposite direc-
tion.  
 
Market ERPT, Individual ERPT and the J-curve 
Market ERPT against the two exchange rate shocks shows ‘J-curve’ 
cases in Figures 1 to 3.10 The US market prices initially responded 
                                                 
9 Another possibility to explain this phenomenon of no-response to Japanese price is the ex-
istence of the switching costs as illustrated by Klemperer (1995), Tivig (1996) and Gross and 
Schmitt (2000).  
10 The possibility of experiencing the ‘J-curve’ for individual ERPT under certain condi-
tions was discussed in Tivig (1996). In that paper, it was shown that the J-curve in trade balance 
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positively to the fluctuation in eJ, although only insignificantly, and in 
turn dropped negatively, which is contrary to its response to the fluc-
tuation in  eK. While Tivig (1996) entertains the theoretical possibility 
of a J-curve for an individual producer’s ERPT11, this J-curve has not 
been thoroughly discussed in empirical works, although many studies 
reported that the prices of specific goods from some countries moved 
perversely when its exchange rate changed. Moreover, there has been 
neither any theoretical nor empirical work done for the J-curve in as-
sociation with the market ERPT. 
If we have two firms competing in the market over two periods, 
each firm’s strategic pricing behavior against exchange rate shocks 
results in 16 different cases.12 With assumptions that capital is imper-
fectly mobile over time, and that producers choose a closed-loop solu-
tion where they can observe and respond to their opponents’ actions 
at the end of each period, Tivig (1996) shows that second period price 
movements of each producer occur in opposite directions.13 It is also 
impossible for country J to respond perversely for both periods if it 
maximizes intertemporal profit. These two findings remove 10 cases 
out of 16, and Table 5 summarizes all the remaining possible cases for 
individual ERPT. The last row for each case in Table 5 indicates the 
direction of the US market price movement for each case of the indi-
vidual ERPT. Figures 1 to 3 indicate that the market ERPT against eJ 
shows similar movements to Case 5, while that against eK demon-
strates similar movements to Cases 2 and 4. 
Case 5 for Japan explains that when the Japanese currency depre-
ciates ERPT for Japan is likely to be normal (Japanese price decreases 
in the US market) in the first period, and then change to be perverse 
(Japanese price increases) during the next period, although only in-
significantly.14 All the other countries respond to Japan’s price change 
by increasing their prices initially and then decreasing them. Cases 2 
and 4 respectively, explain that Korean producers respond to the ex-
change rate shock either perversely (Case 2) or normally (Case 4) in  
                                                                                                         
can be observed due to the perverse movement of individual price in the first period, in a case of 
a single good. 
11 According to his two-period model, all the other countries should increase (decrease) 
their prices in the second period responding to country J’s price increase (decrease) in the first 
period. By strategically behaving like this, firms can increase their market share over time and 
then compensate for the losses incurred by ‘perverse’ movement in the first period. 
12 Two firms’ pricing behavior (price increases or decreases) over two periods with two dif-
ferent results in market average price (market price increases or decreases) provides 2*2*2*2 = 
16 cases.   
13 In order to derive these findings, Tivig (1996) adopted more assumptions such as that 
demand functions are linear and that second-period demand functions are taken to be linear in 
the first period market shares. 
14 The argument in this part uses sufficient conditions as discussed in the previous sections, 
and hence, we cannot exclude the possibility that the market ERPT occurs due to some other 
reasons from those discussed here. 
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<Table 5> Directions of Market ERPT and Individual ERPT Over 
Time 
Case 1st period 2nd period 
1 PJ ↑ ↓ 
Pi ↑      (+) ↑      (−) 
P ↑ ↑ 
   
2 PJ ↑ ↓ 
Pi ↓      (−) ↑      (−) 
P ↓ ↑ 
   
3 PJ ↓ ↑ 
Pi ↓      (+) ↓      (−) 
P ↓ ↓ 
   
4 PJ ↓ ↓ 
Pi ↓      (+) ↑      (−) 
P ↓ ↑ 
   
5 PJ ↓ ↑ 
Pi ↑      (−) ↓      (−) 
P ↑ ↓ 
   
6 PJ ↓ ↓ 
Pi ↑      (−) ↑      (−) 
P ↑ ↑ 
Note: ↑ and ↓ mean ‘increase’ and ‘decrease’.  The signs in parentheses are those for σiJ. 
PJ and Pi are country J’s and i’s prices respectively, and P is market price. 
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the first period, however, only normally in the second period. It is 
possible for Korea to increase its prices temporarily in the first period 
in case of a depreciation of its currency, if its first-period market de-
mand is inelastic, which is Case 4. However, it should reduce its 
prices in the second period to regain the market share that it lost due 
to the perverse movement in the first period. In contrast, all of the 
other producers decrease their prices in the first period regardless of 
Korea’s strategy, take more market share, and can increase prices in 
the next period. 
In addition, Case 4 for Korea indicates that the market J-curve can 
be observed even when the country’s individual ERPT is normal over 
the periods. In this case, the main force to increase price in the second 
period is the increase in the price of the other countries after they re-
tain large market shares in the first period by moving together with 
Korea (that is to decrease prices), and then increase their prices in the 
second period if their demand is inelastic. This J-curve for the market 
price is not found when the Japan–US exchange rate fluctuates. 
 
Long-run Elasticities:  Phillips-Hansen Fully Modified OLS 
For each group, fully modified OLS estimation of Phillips and 
Hansen (1990) was conducted to examine the long-run elasticities 
among the variables, taking each price variable as a dependent vari-
able. Table 6 summarizes the results obtained, which reveal that in the 
long run most of the elasticity estimates among the price variables are, 
when statistically significant, close to one. It should be pointed out, 
that long-run elasticities are found in most cases to be significant in 
both directions of the production line. In the long-run, changes in the 
price for any steel product are almost equi-proportionally transferred 
to those of other steel products in the same production line, regardless 
of whether they are in the upstream or downstream production line.  
The elasticities of the US market price with respect to the Japanese-
US exchange rate, in the long-run were statistically significant in four 
cases out of seven. Excluding the case of P2 in Group 1 where the level 
of significance is marginal, the market price responds negatively 
(which means that the US market price decreases) in the long-run as 
the Japanese yen depreciates against the US dollar. In the previous 
section, we observed that ERPT for the US market (and Japanese) 
prices against eJ were initially negative (normal), and then posi-
tive(perverse). This implies that, while impulse response was, in gen-
eral, insignificant, the perverse movement of the market and Japanese 
prices in the later periods is not sufficient to offset their initial normal 
movement. This is completely contrary to the findings of other studies, 
which argued that ERPT infrequently occurs normally to Japanese 
products.  
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<Table 6> Estimates of Long-Run Elasticities: Fully Modified OLS 
Estimation  
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
 P1 P2 P3 P5 P1 P4 P6 
P1  0.97***    1.04*** 0.84***
P2 0.93***       
P3    0.78***    
P4     0.59***  0.13 
P5   0.93***     
P6     0.25*** 0.17  
eJ - 0.21*** 0.10* - 0.24*** - 0.04 - 0.06* 0.05 - 0.05 
eK 0.16* - 0.06 0.45** - 0.16 0.26*** - 0.30*** - 0.12 
PE 0.01 0.01 - 0.06 0.14*** 0.02* 0.01 - 0.02 
Note: *** : Significant at the 1% level of significance 
 ** : Significant at the 5% level of significance 
  * : Significant at the 10% level of significance 
P1 : hot-rolled strips, P2: hot-rolled sheets, P3: hot bars, P4: cold-rolled strips, P5 : 
cold-rolled sheets, P6: cold bars, eJ: Japan-US exchange rate, eK: Korea-US ex-
change rate, PE : petroleum price 
 
These striking results are also found when the elasticities with re-
spect to the Korean-US exchange rate were considered. The elasticities 
are significant in four cases out of seven, including one marginal case. 
While the depreciation of the Korean won decreases P5 in Group 3 as 
traditional pass-through models expect, it increases market prices ex-
pressed in dollars for P3 in Group 2 and for P1 in Groups 1 and 3. 
Comparing the three products with significant elasticities, with re-
spect to both eJ and eK, provides an even more dramatic contrast: the 
price elasticities with respect to eJ are all negative, while those with 
respect to eK are all positive. In other words, in the long-run, the de-
preciation of the Japanese yen against the US dollar decreases the 
weighted average prices of the products in the US market, while the 
depreciation of the Korean won against the US dollar increases the 
prices of the weighted average prices of the products in the US market. 
This implies that either perverse ERPT to Korean products in the ini-
tial period is so large that it dominates its normal ERPT in the later 
period, and/or an increase in the other countries’ prices in the later 
period dominate. Alternatively, while the ERPT for Korea is normal 
over the periods, all the other countries’ perverse reaction in the sec-
ond period is so large that the market price is eventually pushed up.  
Notice also, that eJ and eK tend to affect the price of upstream prod-
ucts. The price for downstream products (which are close to the end 
user) is not so greatly affected by exchange rate fluctuations as that for 
upstream products. The price elasticities with respect to PE are statis-
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tically significant for P4 and P1, and the coefficients are positive, indi-
cating that the prices of selected steel products respond positively to 
changes in petroleum prices.  
 
 
IV. Summary 
 
 
The effect of exchange rate fluctuations on the price of commodi-
ties has been explored by a host of studies due to its importance in 
trade balance and macroeconomic context (among many, see for ex-
ample, Fitoussi & Cacheux, 1988; Froot & Klemperer, 1989; Krugman, 
1989) and its importance in understanding competition in imperfect 
international markets (for example, see Feenstra et al., 1996; Tivig, 
1996; and Gross and Schmitt, 2000). Unlike previous studies, this 
study concentrates on the market ERPT for similar commodities based 
on the theoretical pursuit of Tivig (1996) for the individual ERPT. While 
Sjaastad (1985), and Sjaastad and Scacciavilani (1996) explored the role 
of exchange rates on commodity prices, our study is unique in that it 
explores the mechanism of the market ERPT and the relationship be-
tween the individual ERPT and the market ERPT. The mechanism that 
market ERPT takes place depends on three stages: (i) pass-through by 
the exporter whose currency has changed in value, (ii) price responses 
by competitors of the exporter and (iii) changes in market share. From 
the market ERPT, the individual ERPT was found for two countries 
competing in the US market (Korea and Japan) as their different pric-
ing strategies are of interest to economists and policy analysts.  
Error correction models and impulse response analyses based on 
VAR contrast the different pricing strategies of Korea and Japan, or 
contrast the different magnitude of impact to the market. Within one 
or two years, changes in the Japanese-US exchange rates show no im-
pact on the US market price, while changes in the Korean-US ex-
change rates are found to be significant. The response of the market 
price towards the fluctuation of both exchange rates empirically re-
veals the J-curve movement, which has not been previously explored 
at the market level.  
The prices of upstream products were also affected significantly. 
However, these results are contrary to the conventional belief in pre-
vious studies once longer run effects are taken into account. For all 
products where fluctuations of both yen-dollar and won-dollar ex-
change rates are significantly influential, the depreciation of the Japa-
nese yen against the US dollar, in fact, decreases the average dollar 
price of the product, while the depreciation of the Korean won against 
the US dollar increases it. This finding implies that the previous ar-
gument may not be valid in the long-run, as Japanese producers ab-
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sorb the impact of exchange rate fluctuations by adjusting their profit 
or price mark-ups. In contrast, the argument that Korean steel pro-
ducers aggressively change their prices in the US market as exchange 
rates change is only partially plausible; their long-run responses are 
frequently perverse.  
In summary, our results show that (i) the market price response in 
the short-run can be different from that in the long-run, (ii) ERPT for 
the market price is not necessarily the same as ERPT for the country 
experiencing currency depreciation or appreciation, and (iii) countries 
may have different pricing strategies against exchange rate shocks 
even when products are similar.  
Exchange Rate Pass-Through and Market Response  311 
 
 
 
References 
 
 
Adolfson, M., “Export Price Responses to Exogenous Exchange Rate 
Movements,” Economics Letters, 71, 2001,  pp.91-96. 
American Metal Market, The Statistical Guide to the Metal Industries: 
Metal Statistics, New York: Chilton Publications, various years. 
Efron, B. and R. J. Tibshirani, An Introduction to the Bootstrap, New 
York: Chapman & Hall, 1993. 
Feenstra, R., “Symmetric Pass-Through of Tariffs and Exchange Rates 
Under Imperfect Competition: An Empirical Test,” Journal of In-
ternational Economics, 27, 1989, pp.25-45. 
Feenstra, R., J. Gagnon, and M. Knetter, “Market Share and Exchange 
Rate Pass-through in World Automobile Trade,” Journal of 
International Economics, 40, 1996, pp.187-207. 
Fisher, L., “Sources of Exchange Rate and Price Level Fluctuations in 
Two Commodity Exporting Countries: Australia and New Zea-
land.” Economic Record, 72, 1996, pp.345-358. 
Fitoussi, J-P. and J. Cacheux, “On Macroeconomic Implications of 
Price Setting in the Open Economy,” AEA Papers and Proceedings, 
May 1998, pp.335-340. 
Froot, K. and P. Klemperer, “Exchange Rate Pass-Through when Mar-
ket Share Matters,” American Economic Review, 79, 1989, pp.637-
654. 
Gagnon, J. and M. Knetter, “Mark-up Adjustment and Exchange Rate 
Fluctuations: Evidence from Panel Data on Automobile Ex-
ports,” Journal of International Money and Finance, 14, 1995, 
pp.289-310. 
Goldberger, P. and M. Knetter, “Goods Prices and Exchange Rates: 
What Have We Learned?” Journal of Economic Literature, 35, 1997, 
pp.1243-1272. 
Gross, D. and N. Schmitt, “Exchange Rate Pass-through and Dynamic 
Oligopoly: An Empirical Investigation,” Journal of International 
Economics, 52, 2000, pp.89-112. 
International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Wash-
ington D.C., various years. 
Johansen, S, “Statistical Analysis of Cointegrating Vectors,” Journal of 
Economic Dynamics and Control, 12, pp.231-254. 
Kilian L., “Small Sample Confidence Intervals for Impulse Response 
Functions,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 80, 1998, pp.218 - 
230. 
Kim, J., “Analysis of Real Effective Exchange Rates and Japan’s Pric-
ing Strategy to Steel Export,” POSRI Steel Journal, 7, 1997, pp.44-
312   KDI 政策硏究 / 2004. II 
59. 
Klemperer, P., “Competition When Consumers Have Switching Costs: 
An Overview with Applications to Industrial Organization, 
Macroeconomics, and International Trade,” Review of Economic 
Studies, 62, 1995, pp.515-539.  
Klitgaard, T., “Exchange Rates and Profit Margins: The Case of Japa-
nese Exporters,” FRBNY Economic Policy Review, April 1999, 
pp.41-54. 
Knetter, M., “Price Discrimination by U.S. and German Exporters,” 
American Economic Review, 83(3), 989, pp.473-486. 
   , “Pricing to Market in Response to Unobservable and Observ-
able Shocks,” International Economic Journal, 9(2), 1995, pp.1-25. 
Krugman, P., “Pricing-to-Market when the Exchange Rate changes,” 
in S.W. Arndt and J.D.Richardson (eds.), Real Financial Linkages 
among Open Economies, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1987. 
Laussel, D., C. Montet, and A. Peguin-Feissolle, “Optimal Trade Pol-
icy Under Oligopoly,” European Economic Review, 32, 1988, 
pp.1547-1556. 
Ljung, G.M. and G. E. P. Box, “On a Measure of Lack of Fit in Time 
Series Models,” Biometrika, 65, 1978, pp. 297-303. 
Lütkepohl, H., Introduction to Multiple Time Series Analysis, Berlin: 
Springer-Verlag, 1991. 
Marston, R., “Pricing to Market in Japanese Manufacturing,” Journal of 
International Economics, 29, 1990, pp.217-223. 
Philip, P.C.B and B. E. Hansen, “Statistical Inference in Instrumental 
Variables Regression with I(1) Processes,” Review of Economic 
Studies, 57, 1990, pp.407-436. 
Taylor, M., “The Economics of Exchange Rates,” Journal of Economic 
Literature, 33, 1995, pp.13-47. 
Tcha, M. and L. Sjaastad, “Analysis of Steel Prices.” Ch. 7 in Y. Wu Ed., 
The Economics of the East Asian Steel Industry, London: Ashgate, 
1998, pp.207-224. 
Tivig, T., “Exchange Rate Pass-through in Two-period Duopoly,” In-
ternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 14, 1996, pp.631-645. 
Varangis, P. and R. Duncan, “Exchange Rate Pass Through-An Appli-
cation to US and Japanese Steel Prices,” Resources Policy, March, 
1993, pp.30-39. 
World Steel Dynamics, Steel Strategies, New York: Paine Weber, 1997, 
2000. 
World Trade Organization, International Trade: Trends and Statistics, 
Geneva: WTO, 1997. 
Exchange Rate Pass-Through and Market Response  313 
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
 
Given m realizations (Y1, …, Ym) of (8), the unknown coefficients 
are estimated using the least-squares (LS) method. The LS estimators  
for B = (B1, …, Bp) and Σu are denoted as Bˆ = ( 1ˆ , ,B L ˆpB ) and ˆ u∑ .  
The orthogonalized impulse responses are defined as Θr = Φr H, where Σu = HH’ and Φr's are the coefficients of the MA(∞) representation of 
(8). A typical element of Θr is denoted as θkl,r, and is interpreted as the 
response of the variable k to a one-time impulse in variable l, r  
period ago. Using  and Bˆ ˆ u∑ , the estimator for impulse response  
for θ
,kˆ l rθ
kl, r can be calculated.  
The bootstrap-after-bootstrap confidence interval for θkl,r can be 
constructed as the following two stages. In Stage 1, we generate a 
pseudo data set following the recursion  
 
*
tY = * 11ˆ ...tB Y − + *ˆ ,t p tpB Y u−+ + *  (A1) 
 
using the first p values of the original data as starting values. Note 
that ut* is a random draw from the residuals of the LS estimation of 
the model. Using {Yt*} m , the coefficient matrices are re-estimated and  1t=
denoted as *Bˆ = ( *1ˆ ,...,B *ˆ )pB . Repeat this process to generate 5000  
sets of {Yt*}   and obtain the corresponding 5000 bootstrap replicates  1mt =
of . The bias of  can be estimated as ˆ *B Bˆ * ˆˆ B BΨ = − , where *B is the  
sample mean of 5000 bootstrap replicates of . The bias-corrected  ˆ *B
estimate for B can be obtained as ˆ ˆB B= − Ψ% , implementing the sta 
tionarity correction detailed in Kilian (1998)115.  
In Stage 2, generate a pseudo data set following the recursion  
 
* * *
11 ... ,t t t ppY B Y B Y u− −= + + +% % *t  
 
in the same way as in (A1). Note, that we now use the bias-
corrected parameter estimators to generate the pseudo data set  
{Yt*} . Re-estimate the coefficient matrices using {Y1mt = t*} 1mt =   and the  
parameter estimator is denoted as . The bias-corrected estimator is 
obtained as 
*Bˆ
* *ˆ ˆB B= − Ψ% , again implementing the stationarity cor-
                                                 
1 The stationary correction is given to prevent the parameter estimators from becoming non-
stationary as a result of bias-correction. 
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rection. Repeat this process to generate 5000 bootstrap replicates of   
*B% , from which 5000 bootstrap replicates  of impulse responses  * ,kˆ l rθ
are obtained. 
The 100(1-2α)% bootstrap-after-bootstrap confidence intervals for  
θkl,r can be constructed as the interval [ (α), (1-α)], where  * ,kˆ l rθ * ,kˆ l rθ
*
,kˆ l rθ (g) is the gth percentile from the distribution of 5000 bootstrap 
replicates of  based on the percentile method of Efron and Tib- * ,kˆ l rθ
shirani (1993, p.160). This confidence interval can be used to test for 
statistical significance of impulse response estimates. If a 95% (90%) 
confidence interval contains zero, the null hypothesis of zero impulse 
response value cannot be rejected at the 5% (10%) level of significance. 
According to Killian (1998), this bootstrap-after-bootstrap confidence 
interval performs substantially better than other conventional alterna-
tives for statistical inference of impulse response estimates, especially 
for the cointegrated VAR model when the sample size is small. There-
fore, we firmly believe that the application of this method will cer-
tainly provide more robust and reliable results. 
 
